Detecting Traffic Engineering from public BGP data - LAAS-Réseaux et Communications
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2025

Detecting Traffic Engineering from public BGP data

Résumé

Routing is essential to the Internet functioning. However, more and more functions are added to BGP, the inter-AS routing protocol. In addition to providing connectivity for best effort service, it carries flow specification rules and blackholing signals to react to DDoS, routes for virtual private networks, IGP link-state database information among other uses. One such addition is the tweaking of BGP advertisements to engineer the traffic, to direct it on some preferred paths. In this paper we aim to estimate the impact of Traffic Engineering (TE) on the BGP ecosystem. We develop a method to detect the impact in space, that is, to find which traffic engineering technique impacts which prefix and which AS. We design a methodology to pinpoint TE events to quantify the impact on time. We find that on average, a BGP vantage point sees 35% of the announced prefixes impacted by TE. Quantifying the impact of TE on BGP stability, we find that TE events contribute to 39% of BGP updates and 44% of the BGP convergence time, and that prefixes belonging to hypergiants contribute the most to TE.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
te-paper.pdf (602.78 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
paper-22.zip (1.22 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-04840370 , version 1 (17-12-2024)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-04840370 , version 1

Citer

Omar Darwich, Cristel Pelsser, Kevin Vermeulen. Detecting Traffic Engineering from public BGP data. 2024. ⟨hal-04840370⟩
0 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Partager

More